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By means of a consideration of Whitman (1998) the present paper considers the 
meanings of ‘Panglossianism’ and the relation between group and individual levels in 
evolution.  It establishes the connection between the Panglossian policy prescription 
of laissez-faire and the mistaken evolutionary theory of group selection.  Analysis of 
the passages in Hayek cited by Whitman shows that, once these passages are taken in 
context, and once the appropriate meaning of the term ‘Panglossian’ has been 
clarified, they fail to defend Hayek from this charge, but, on the contrary, confirm that 
Hayek was, indeed, ‘a Panglossian evolutionary theorist’. 
 
















This paper is a response to Whitman (1998) ‘Hayek contra Pangloss on Evolutionary 
Systems’, which seeks to exculpate Hayek from the charge of Panglossianism in his 
application of evolutionary theory to society.  The present paper argues that Whitman 
has misunderstood the substance of the accusation of Panglossianism against Hayek2.  
He may have been indirectly influenced by Gould and Lewontin (1979), which is 
widely assumed to identify Panglossianism with Darwinian adaptationism.  Prior to 
that paper, the term Panglossian in evolutionary theory referred to the group 
selectionist fallacy, that groups could be selected in which individuals behaved 
altruistically.  Thereafter, however, it was – less appropriately – taken to refer to 
Darwinian adaptationism, the view that features of organisms could be understood by 
asking what function they would best carry out.   
 
The paper begins by considering the meanings of the term ‘Panglossian’ and the 
relation between group and individual levels in evolution.  It establishes the 
connection between the Panglossian policy prescription of laissez-faire and the 
mistaken evolutionary theory of group selection.  Attention then turns to an analysis 
of the passages in Hayek cited by Whitman.  The analysis shows that, once these 
passages are taken in context, and once the older, and more appropriate, meaning of 
the term Panglossian has been re-established, they do nothing to defend Hayek from 
this charge, but, on the contrary, provide compelling evidence that Hayek was, indeed, 
‘a Panglossian evolutionary theorist’.  A final section summarises the findings of the 
paper.     
 
 
2 The meaning of the term Panglossian in evolutionary theory 
 
“The phrase ‘Pangloss’s theorem’ was first used in the debate about 
evolution … not as a criticism of adaptive explanations, but specifically as 
a criticism of ‘group-selectionist’, mean-fitness-maximising arguments” 
(John Maynard Smith cited in Dennett, 1995: 239). 
 
Daniel Dennett (1995: 238-9) argues for a distinction between Leibnizian and 
Panglossian paradigms, which he identifies in biology with the standpoints of 
individual and group adaptationism, respectively.  Dennett regards the Leibnizian 
standpoint as the source of the bulk of our understanding of the living world.  To 
understand a biological structure or phenomenon, the most fruitful approach is to 
‘reverse-engineer’ it, to ask what purpose the structure would best serve were it the 
result of deliberate invention.  No understanding of the heart, for example, is possible 
except on the hypothesis that it is there for a specific purpose: to pump blood around 
the body; similarly, the chain of structures from lungs to mitochondria can only be 
understood on the basis of the rôle these structures play in respiration.  Now 
adaptationism works well, though imperfectly, at the level of the individual organism.  
A major source of these imperfections is the fact that the replicators, in whose interest 
inherited characteristics should be understood as operating, are, not individual 
organisms, but those organisms’ genes.  Once the individual organism is understood 
as a vehicle of the underlying replicator, the gene (Dawkins, 1989b: 82), many of 
these imperfections vanish.  Nevertheless, taking as a working hypothesis that the 
structure and behaviour of an organism is adaptive is a fruitful approach because all 
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parts of the organism share a common genotype – and hence a common interest – 
which they can best realise by cooperating.  The ‘selfish organism’ is close to the 
‘selfish gene’ (Dawkins, 1989a: 6).   
 
Panglossianism, on the other hand, according to Dennett, is the assumption of group 
selection – ‘the old Panglossian fallacy that natural selection favours adaptations that 
are good for the species as a whole, rather than acting at the level of the individual’ 
(John Maynard Smith cited in Dennett, 1995: 239).  The group selectionist argument 
has been succinctly expressed and criticised by Richard Dawkins:  
 
“A group, such as a species or a population within a species, whose 
individual members are prepared to sacrifice themselves for the welfare of 
the group, may be less likely to go extinct than a rival group whose 
individual members place their own selfish interests first.  Therefore the 
world becomes populated mainly by groups consisting of self-sacrificing 
individuals.  This is the theory of ‘group selection’ [expressed] in a 
famous book by V.C. Wynne-Edwards [Animal Dispersion in Relation to 
Social Behaviour]... [But if] there is just one selfish rebel, prepared to 
exploit the altruism of the rest, then he, by definition, is more likely than 
they are to survive and have children.  Each of these children will tend to 
inherit his selfish traits.  After several generations of natural selection, the 
‘altruistic group’ will be over-run by selfish individuals, and will be 
indistinguishable from the selfish group.” (Dawkins, 1989a: 7-8) 
 
The members of a group, unlike the members of an organism, have diverse interests: 
each individual is set up to realise the interests of its own DNA, by getting that DNA 
copied as many times as it can into future generations, by using the structures, 
executing the behaviours and exemplifying the predispositions which have tended to 
achieve that goal in the past.  The members of an organism share an interest in 
cooperation, those of a group, for lack of a shared interest, must, perforce, compete.  
Now, clearly, groups (populations, species) do die out, and whether a group happens 
to die out may depend on the behaviour of the individual members of that group.  But 
for that fact to exert any evolutionary selective pressure, there must be a mechanism 
such that the behaviour, on the basis of which the group is to be selected, is actually in 
the interest of its members to carry out.   
 
So, according to Dennett and Maynard Smith, Panglossianism in evolutionary theory 
originally referred to the ‘group selectionist fallacy’.  Then later Gould and Lewontin  
used the term to refer, in the words of the title of their article (1979: 581), to ‘the 
adaptationist programme’.  The Gould and Lewontin article has stirred considerable 
interest and controversy.  Dennett’s verdict on the paper is to read it as an attack on 
the excesses of adaptationism – adaptationism as ideology rather than heuristic – 
which has been massively misread as a refutation of adaptationism:   
 
“Gould and Lewontin memorably dubbed the excesses of adaptationism 
the ‘Panglossian Paradigm,’ and strove to ridicule it off the stage of 
serious science … The Gould and Lewontin article … is widely regarded 
… as some sort of refutation of adaptationism.”  (Dennett, 1995: 239) 
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Though not intending any direct reference to the Gould and Lewontin paper 
(Whitman, personal communication), it is in fact in this – mistaken – sense that 
Whitman responds to the charge of Panglossianism against Hayek.  But it is in the 
other, the Maynard-Smithian, not the Gould-Lewontinian, sense that Hayek can 
sensibly be accused of Panglossianism.  On this charge, Whitman’s article does 
nothing to defend Hayek; on the contrary, Hayek’s real Panglossianism is brought out 
clearly in the passages that Whitman cites.   
 
The big question is this: given that it is individual humans who choose their behaviour 
in the context of their inherited predispositions and capacities, and the range of social 
norms and examples of behaviour presented to them, can behaviours be systematically 
selected which are beneficial for the group or society of humans but impose a cost on 
the individuals carrying out those behaviours?  Hayek gives an unambiguous yes, he 
refers repeatedly and approvingly to ‘group selection’, and supports his argument with 
reference to the very book by Wynne-Edwards criticised by Dawkins in the passage 
cited above.  Speaking of the rules of conduct in primitive human societies, he says 
that  
 
“the ‘functions’ which these rules serve we shall be able to discover only 
after we have reconstructed the overall order which is produced by actions 
in accordance with them ... all the individuals of the species which exist 
will behave in that manner because groups of individuals which have thus 
behaved have displaced those which did not do so.”  (Hayek, 1967: 70) 
 
And in a footnote to this passage, Hayek refers the reader to the ‘[a]mple further 
illustrations of the kind of orders briefly sketched in this section ... in V.C. Wynne-
Edwards, Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Behaviour , Edinburgh, 1962’ 
(Hayek, 1967: 70 n7).   
 
When we act, what we do is describable, if sufficiently regular, by a rule.  But the 
question is whether the rule is an epiphenomenon, like the arrow formation of geese 
flying in each others’ slipstreams, a pattern which emerges from generalising a large 
number of instances of the particular action, or whether the individual actions are 
executed because of the rule.  In the first case, the collective outcome is just what 
happens to result from the actions of many individuals each following their own 
interests.  In the second case, the actions of individuals are functional for the purposes 
served by the rule.  The use of the term ‘functions’ in the passage cited  albeit in 
quotation marks  only illustrates Hayek’s functionalism.  As Hodgson says,  
 
“Vanberg … is right to suggest that Hayek’s argument has a functionalist 
quality; it assumes that the contribution of a rule to the maintenance of a 
system is sufficient to explain the existence of that rule.  Absent in 
Hayek’s argument is the specification of a process by which a rule that is 
advantageous to the system is sustained in operation within that system.” 
(Hodgson, 1993: 168) 
 
It is a basic assumption in Hayek that individual actions serve a ‘function’ for the 
collective, that is, that in carrying through one’s own interest, one is simultaneously 
(and more importantly) carrying through the interest of society; that actions performed 
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by individuals are automatically functional for society.  This is to assume all our 
problems – theoretical and practical – away.   
 
So, to the question, whether behaviours can be systematically selected, which are 
beneficial for the group or society of humans but impose a cost on the individuals 
carrying out those behaviours, Hayek answers yes.  But in reality the correct answer is 
no, and for exactly the same reasons as in the biological context.  If a population or 
group of humans follows rules for altruistic behaviour, it may prosper and expand at 
the expense of a similar population following a different, more selfish rule.  But if, in 
that altruistic population, a rebel adopts the selfish rule, the rule coding for the more 
selfish behaviour, then he will prosper relatively to the more altruistic members of the 
population.  The rule for the selfish behaviour will tend to displace its altruistic allele: 
other members of the population will see its connection with personal success and 
wish to adopt it.  Rules for socially desirable behaviour can only be successful to the 
extent that there is a mechanism giving individuals the incentive to engage in that 
behaviour.  Wynne-Edwards group selection is as fallacious in the social as in the 
biological context, and for identical reasons.  It is in this sense that Hayek can justly 
be criticised for ‘Panglossianism’. 
 
 
3 FA Hayek: No Panglossian? 
 
The previous section presented the argument that what was wrong with Hayek’s 
account of cultural evolution was that he applied to the social context the fallacious 
group selectionist theory of Wynne-Edwards.  That is not how Whitman sees things, 
however.  He defends Hayek, instead, against the charge of adaptationism, of 
Dennett’s ‘Leibnizian paradigm, and doesn’t consider neither the differences between 
adaptationism applied at the level of the individual and the level of the group.  One 
section of Whitman’s article in particular is germane to the discussion: Section 2 
‘F. A. Hayek: No Panglossian’ (47-493) – the heart of Whitman’s essay.  Here 
Whitman cites four passages in which Hayek supposedly rejects Panglossianism.  
Each is worth considering in detail.   
 
The first such passage (48) is a citation from The Fatal Conceit, where Hayek seems 
to show himself aware of the problem with potentially Panglossian interpretations, 
and dissociates himself from them: 
 
“I have no intention to commit what is often called the genetic or 
naturalistic fallacy.  I do not claim that the results of group selection of 
traditions are necessarily “good” – any more than I claim that other things 
that have survived in the course of evolution, such as cockroaches, have 
moral value.” (Hayek, 1988: 27). 
    
The context of this passage is a polemic with AGN Flew over his 1967 booklet 
Evolutionary Ethics.  Now, the notion of evolution deployed by Hayek was intended, 
I submit, not to provide a scientific understanding of the social order, warts and all, 
which has emerged from a blind, pitilessly indifferent evolutionary process (Dawkins, 
1995: 155), but to present that order as something desirable, beyond the competence 
of humans to interfere with.  The significance of Evolutionary Ethics here is that Flew 
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got the apologetic, role of evolution in this scheme of thought exactly right in his 
discussion of Social Darwinism: 
 
“many people are inclined to believe, that whatever is in any sense natural 
must be as such commendable, and that Nature is a deep repository of 
wisdom, [so] for many the process of evolution by natural selection 
becomes a secular surrogate for Divine Providence; and ... for some the 
possibility, or even the duty, of relying on this benign and mighty force 
presents itself as a decisive reason why positive social policies must be 
superfluous, and may be wrong  indeed almost blasphemous!” (Flew, 
1967: 15) 
 
So Hayek is responding to the charge, in Evolutionary Ethics, that those who thought 
along the lines actually adopted by himself were committing the ‘naturalistic fallacy’, 
deriving an ought from an is.  Flew is clear that such a standpoint is Panglossian: if 
evolution leads to an institutional structure which has been selected for its beneficial 
influence on human societies, then certainly there will be excellent reason to leave 
that inherited institutional structure alone.  Whitman cites the passage from The Fatal 
Conceit to support his view that Hayek rejects such Panglossianism. 
 
A number of points can be made about Hayek’s response here.  Firstly, we have to be 
quite clear here that Hayek’s statement about not committing the naturalistic fallacy is 
a claim on Hayek’s part: it is not (necessarily) what he says, but what he says he says.  
Hayek himself points out that what scientists describe as their own procedure is not to 
be trusted: ‘The scientist reflecting and theorizing about his procedure is not always a 
reliable guide’ (Hayek, 1942, cited in Ransom, 1996).  Hayek’s claim here no more 
closes the matter, than the denial of a suspect that he robbed the bank must eliminate 
him as a suspect.  And the fact that Hayek is aware of the naturalistic fallacy is, again,  
no more evidence against him committing it, than a suspected bank robber’s 
agreement, that robbing banks is illegal, would be evidence of his innocence.  
 
Secondly, what is truly significant here is that Hayek refers to the ‘group selection of 
traditions’, because – as we have seen, and whatever claims Hayek chooses to make 
on the subject – group selection, of the Wynne-Edwards variety, to which, as we have 
seen, Hayek explicitly refers his theory, does lead to Panglossian conclusions.  
Wynne-Edwardsian group selection, as Maynard Smith says, is ‘the old Panglossian 
fallacy’.   
 
And thirdly, taking the passage in the context in which it occurs, it is clear that Hayek 
does endow the products of cultural evolution with moral value: they are products of a 
process of selection according to human survival value, and the products of biological 
evolution, such as cockroaches, are not.  The very next sentence after those cited by 
Whitman make this abundantly clear: 
 
“I do claim that … without the particular traditions I have mentioned, the 
extended order of civilization could not continue to exist (whereas, were 
cockroaches to disappear, the resulting ecological ‘disaster’ would perhaps 
not wreak permanent havoc on mankind); and that if we discard these 
traditions … we shall doom a large part of mankind to poverty and death.” 
(Hayek, 1988: 27). 
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Whitman’s second example is also from The Fatal Conceit: 
 
“It would be wrong to conclude, strictly from such evolutionary premises, 
that whatever rules have evolved are always or necessarily conducive to 
the survival and increase of the populations following them … 
Recognizing that rules generally tend to be selected, via competition, on 
the basis of their human survival-value certainly does not protect those 
rules from critical scrutiny”  (Hayek, 1988: 20). 
 
But, if ‘human survival-value’ is indeed the basis for selection, one may well wonder, 
on what basis this scrutiny is to be carried out?  The assumption is that the basic 
process is a human-favourable one.  One can only criticise it on the basis of details, 
not the fundamental processes involved.  Whitman’s gloss on this passage is that  
 
“Hayek believes that the cultural selection process selects for survival and 
reproduction of groups … yet even by that criterion of efficiency, the 
resulting rules cannot be assumed to be efficient.  It would be particularly 
odd, then, for those rules to be efficient according to some other standard, 
such as neoclassical economic efficiency or classical liberal value 
judgements.”  (48) 
 
Hence, again, the claim is that Hayek’s standpoint is not Panglossian.  But Hayek here 
is clearly saying that cultural rules tend to be selected for human survival-value – the 
outcome in each case, however, may for extraneous reasons be suboptimal on this 
score, and hence subject to critical scrutiny.  Nevertheless, the tendency for selection 
according to human survival-value is in place and hence the critical scrutiny he 
alludes to can only be a matter of details, not of substance.  The process itself is 
immune from such scrutiny.  This is shown clearly if we look in more detail at the 
passage in The Fatal Conceit from which Whitman’s extract is taken: 
 
“It would however be wrong to conclude, strictly from such evolutionary 
premises, that whatever rules have evolved are always or necessarily 
conducive to the survival and increase of the populations following them.  
We need to show, with the help of economic analysis … how rules that 
emerge spontaneously tend to promote human survival.  Recognizing that 
rules generally tend to be selected, via competition, on the basis of their 
human survival-value certainly does not protect those rules from critical 
scrutiny.  This is so, if for no other reason, because there has so often been 
coercive interference in the process of cultural evolution.”  (Hayek, 1988: 
20.  Italics highlight the parts elided in Whitman’s extract.) 
 
Contrary to Whitman’s interpretation, Hayek is clearly saying, that we can assume 
that spontaneous evolutionary forces will tend to lead to desirable outcomes.  He is 
saying that we cannot assume desirable social outcomes from ‘such evolutionary 
premises’, that is, those he had just been talking about, where vested interests often 
‘blocked the next step of evolution’ (Hayek, 1988: 20) by the use of state power.  
Instead, he says, we must use economic analysis to show how spontaneous rules lead 
to desirable social outcomes – not, we should note, to enquire whether they do this, 
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but to show that they do so.  That spontaneous processes lead to human-favourable 
outcomes is taken for granted.  It is what ‘we need to show’.  That is Panglossianism.   
 
Whitman is keen to point out that, in Hayek’s view, the rules resulting from the 
evolutionary process are not exempt from critical scrutiny.  This is supposed to show 
that spontaneous evolutionary processes are not assumed to lead to Panglossian 
results.  But it actually shows the opposite, since the reason Hayek wants critical 
scrutiny of those rules is that they may be corrupted by an admixture of state influence 
(‘coercive interference’).  The spontaneous processes themselves are automatically 
benign, it is state intervention which spoils things.   
 
Whitman’s third example is from The Constitution of Liberty: 
 
“These considerations, of course, do not prove that all sets of moral 
beliefs which have grown up in a society will be beneficial.  Just as a 
group may owe its rise to the morals which its members obey, … so may a 
group or nation destroy itself by the moral beliefs to which it adheres”  
(Hayek, 1960: 67). 
 
Again, the point of the citation is to show that Hayek, far from embracing 
Panglossianism, is well aware of the possibility of suboptimal outcomes of the social 
evolutionary process.  But to see the full meaning of the passage cited, we once again 
need to look at somewhat more of the passage in Hayek, from which Whitman’s 
extract has been taken, than Whitman does.  In The Constitution of Liberty, Hayek 
allows that the points he has previously made  
 
“do not prove that all the sets of moral beliefs which have grown up in a 
society will be beneficial .... [A] group or nation [may] destroy itself by 
the moral beliefs to which it adheres.  Only the eventual results can show 
whether the ideals which guide a group are beneficial or destructive .... It 
may well be that a nation may destroy itself by following the teaching of 
what it regards as its best men .... There would be little danger of this in a 
society whose members were still free to choose their way of practical 
life, because in such a society such tendencies would be self-corrective: 
only groups guided by “impractical” ideals would decline, and others, less 
moral by current standards, would take their place.  But this will happen 
only in a free society in which such ideals are not enforced on all.” 
(Hayek, 1960: 67) 
 
So, although Hayek admits that suboptimal systems may evolve, firstly, this can only 
be judged by ‘eventual results’: there is thus a presumption that it is impermissible for 
governments rationalistically to step in beforehand to avert the catastrophe.  Secondly, 
he is able to assert that there would be ‘little danger’ of suboptimal results in a ‘free 
society’ – by appeal to an argument which assumes optimality: ‘groups guided by 
“impractical” ideas would decline, and others … would take their place’.  The 
assumption is that what is good for individuals is good for their group and what is 
good for the group is good for the nation.  But of course the behaviour which is Nash 
for agents within a society (whether those agents themselves be individuals or 
groups), the behaviour, that is, which issues from the evolutionarily stable strategies 
which emerge from the evolutionary process (Smith, 1982: 10), cannot be assumed to 
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be optimal for the society as a whole.  Individuals and groups do not achieve pre-
eminence in a nation by following rules which it would be in the interest of the nation 
for everyone to follow, but by following rules which are well adapted for gaining 
power and influence within a nation’s establishment.  So, again, passages in Hayek 
which Whitman thinks point away from the charge of Panglossianism actually point 
towards it.  
 
Whitman’s own response to the passage he cites from The Constitution of Liberty is as 
follows: 
 
“Of course, this statement could be interpreted as merely a view of 
selection-in-progress, in that “bad” moral views are characterized as 
leading inevitably to their own demise.  The point, however, is that Hayek 
does not perceive the process as finished: at any point in time including 
the present day, we may find undesirable rules and customs that have not 
been weeded out by selective forces, at least not yet.” (48) 
 
But it makes a very big difference to policy response to perceived sub-optimalities, 
whether they are believed to be (a) the intermediate result of a fundamentally human-
favourable process which has not yet run its course, or (b) the result of a 
fundamentally human-indifferent process.  The former conviction will tend to lead to 
a policy prescription of procrastination, gradualism and minor adjustment; the latter to 
one of more prompt and, potentially, radical reform.  The passage is in keeping with 
the overall tenor of Hayek’s work: spontaneous processes are optimal and are best left 
alone.  Whitman seems unwilling to accept the simple message of Hayek’s life work, 
that the policy prescription is one of laissez-faire: 
 
“Hayek never eschews the modification and reform of rules; he simply 
points out that any such revision of particular rules must necessarily take 
place in the context of a complex of other rules that are taken as given for 
the time being” (48). 
 
Of course Hayek doesn’t object to the of modification of rules: but he wants them to 
be modified to give greater play to spontaneous processes, not less.  Whitman seems 
to misunderstand Hayek’s desire to modify the policy framework, in order to bring it 
more into line with laissez-faire, as a step away from laissez-faire.  Later in the paper, 
Whitman argues that Hayek’s standpoint cannot be Panglossian because he argues for 
‘the occasional corrective reform, which would be unnecessary in a perfectly self-
correcting (or instantaneously optimal) evolutionary system’ (55).  However, it is not 
the spontaneous evolutionary process which is imperfectly self-correcting, in Hayek’s 
view, but interference with it on the part of authority.  And it is not necessary for 
Hayek to regard his evolutionary system as ‘instantaneously optimal’ for us to see that 
it is Panglossian – what is required is that it tends to generate results which serve 
human purposes, not that it achieves those results perfectly and instantaneously.  The 
essence of Pangloss’s world view was that we live in the best of all possible worlds, 
not of all worlds whether possible or not: belief in ‘instantaneous optimality’ is not a 
sensible criterion for judging alleged instances of Panglossianism. 
 
This theme, concerning whether perceived sub-optimalities are believed to be the 
intermediate result of a fundamentally human-favourable process which has not yet 
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run its course, or, on the contrary, the result of a fundamentally human-indifferent 
process, also arises in connection with Whitman’s fourth example of Hayek rejecting 
Panglossianism:   
 
“The fact that law that has evolved in this way has certain desirable 
properties does not prove that it will always be good law or even that 
some of its rules may not be very bad.  It therefore does not mean that we 
can altogether dispense with legislation”  (Hayek, 1973: 88). 
 
Again, we should do well to situate this passage in the context within which it appears 
in Hayek’s writing.  Hayek says that 
 
“The fact that all [spontaneously grown] law … will of necessity possess 
some desirable properties not necessarily possessed by the commands of a 
legislator does not mean that in other respects such law may not develop 
in very undesirable directions, and that when this happens correction by 
deliberate legislation may not be the only practicable way out.  For a 
variety of reasons the spontaneous process of growth may lead into an 
impasse from which it cannot extricate itself by its own forces or which it 
will at least not correct quickly enough … The fact that law that has 
evolved in this way has certain desirable properties does not prove that it 
will always be good law or even that some of its rules may not be very 
bad.  It therefore does not mean that we can altogether dispense with 
legislation … the most frequent cause is probably that the development of 
the law has lain in the hands of members of a particular class”  (Hayek, 
1973: 88-89) 
 
We may note that the passage continues the theme we have already noted of focusing 
on the exceptional, bad outcomes of an essentially good process: law evolves in a 
desirable way, but some laws may be undesirable.  As just mentioned, it also touches 
on the theme of undesirable outcomes resulting from an essentially benign process not 
yet having run its course.  We should also note the last sentence of the passage cited 
by Whitman: ‘It therefore does not mean that we can altogether dispense with 
legislation’.  In the previous section Hayek had so praised the evolutionary process of 
common law that one might think legislation itself superfluous.  Here he needs to step 
back from a position on legislation which many might regard as beyond the pale of 
extremity.  The rôle of the passage cited is to take the extremist edge off an argument 
which might otherwise deny any scope at all for legislation.  The context is a massive 
pre-supposition that spontaneous processes lead to optimal results.  The major and 
‘most frequent’ cause for radical change requiring legislation is the recognition that 
existing law was biased in favour of some group over-represented in the state.  Again, 
the assumption is that spontaneous processes are essentially benign, and that it is state 
encroachments which induce suboptimality of outcomes4.  So this passage, too, gives 
very little support to the notion that Hayek’s attitude towards social evolutionary 




This article has argued that, contrary to Whitman’s defence, Hayek is indeed a 
Panglossian evolutionary theorist.  Hayek’s policy stance is a prescription of laissez-
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faire, and his economic and evolutionary theory underpins that policy prescription.  
His evolutionary theory says that spontaneous processes tend towards optimal social 
outcomes.  To the extent that they issue from such spontaneous processes, the 
institutions which we inherit are those which have been selected according to the 
benefits they have conferred on the societies adopting them.  This is Panglossian in 
the social sense: the institutional structure we inherit tends strongly to be desirable 
and attempts to improve it by conscious collective action are very much to be avoided.  
And it is Panglossian in the technical, evolutionary sense of Wynne-Edwards’s 
erroneous theory of group selection, a theory that Hayek explicitly endorses.  In his 
consideration of biological evolutionary theory, Whitman fails to identify 
Panglossianism with Wynne-Edwards group selection.  In the passage from biological 
to cultural evolution, Whitman fails to realise that the distinction between the 
individual and group retains its significance in full.  Once we look closely at the 
passages in Hayek to which Whitman directs our attention, our verdict on Hayek’s 
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2
 Note that the issue is not whether Hayek is guilty of Panglossianism in the sense of 
believing that all is for the best in the world we inhabit, but whether his theory of 
cultural evolutionary processes is Panglossian.  As the title of Whitman’s article 
shows, and as we would expect of an Austrian economist, what is at issue is process 
not end state.   
 
3
 Unqualified page numbers refer to Whitman (1998). 
 
4
 It is also the case that there is a technical reason why legislation may be necessary: 
when changes in the law are required, this cannot be achieved by case law – it would 
be unjust to do so, as case law can only determine what was the law in the past, not 
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